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DELEGATING OR DIVESTING? 
Philip Hamburger 
ABSTRACT—A gratifying feature of recent scholarship on administrative 
power is the resurgence of interest in the Founding. Even the defenders of 
administrative power hark back to the Constitution’s early history—most 
frequently to justify delegations of legislative power. But the past offers cold 
comfort for such delegation.  
A case in point is Delegation at the Founding by Professors Julian 
Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley. Not content to defend the Supreme 
Court’s current nondelegation doctrine, the article employs history to 
challenge the doctrine—arguing that the Constitution does not limit 
Congress’s delegation of legislative power. But the article’s most central 
historical claims are mistaken. For example, when quoting key eighteenth-
century authors, the article makes errors of omission and commission—
leaving out passages that contradict its position and misunderstanding the 
passages it recites. The initial goal of this Essay is therefore to explain the 
evidentiary mistakes in the attack on nondelegation. 
This Essay’s broader aim, however, is conceptual: it points out two 
basic principles that have thus far received insufficient attention from both 
the defenders and opponents of administrative power.  
First, the delegation problem can be understood more specifically as a 
question of vesting. To be sure, the nondelegation doctrine should be put 
aside—not on the grounds offered by Professors Mortenson and Bagley, but 
because the Constitution speaks instead in stronger terms about vesting. 
Thus, what are generically depicted as questions of delegation can be 
understood more specifically in terms of vesting and divesting. It thereby 
becomes apparent that Congress cannot vest in others, or divest itself of, any 
power that the Constitution vests in it.  
Second, it is necessary to draw attention to a much-neglected idea of 
executive power. Recent scholarship has debated widely different 
conceptions of executive power—Mortenson’s view, now echoed by Bagley, 
being that executive power is an “empty vessel.” But all such scholarship 
tends to ignore another conception of executive power: that it involves the 
nation’s action, strength, or force. This understanding of executive power 
has foundations in eighteenth-century thought—as revealed even by the 
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authors quoted by Mortenson and Bagley. Indeed, it is the conception 
asserted by Federalist Number 78 and evident in the Constitution itself. 
 A narrow historical inquiry thus points to broad conceptual lessons. 
Both delegation and executive power need to be reconsidered on the basis of 
the Constitution and its history. 
   
AUTHOR—Philip Hamburger is the Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor 
of Law at Columbia Law School, and President of the New Civil Liberties 
Alliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent appearance of Delegation at the Founding (the Article) by 
Professors Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley has already caused 
a stir.1 Even the New Republic and The Atlantic have taken notice, for the 
Article seems to bring good news from the past for the administrative state.2 
According to the Article, the Constitution did not bar delegation. To be 
precise, Mortenson and Bagley argue that, under the U.S. Constitution, 
 
 1 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV.  
(forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (as published on SSRN on May 26, 2020).  
 2 Matt Ford, The Plot to Level the Administrative State, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/156207/plot-level-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/N4S4-RZG2]; 
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, There’s No Historical Justification for One of the Most 
Dangerous Ideas in American Law, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/nondelegation-doctrine-orliginalism/612013/ 
[https://perma.cc/6DHS-BL3K]. Among other commentaries, see Robert Verbruggen, Is ‘Most of 
Government’ Unconstitutional?, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 9, 2020, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/01/nondelegation-doctrine-debate-is-most-government-
unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/M8UU-75CS].  
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although Congress cannot irrevocably “transfer” or “alienate” legislative 
power, it can revocably “delegate” it.3 
But is this true? “Not so fast,” argues Professor Ilan Wurman—joined 
by others, such as Aaron Gordon and Rob Natelson.4 This Essay more 
systematically questions the claims by Professors Mortenson and Bagley, 
most basically on evidentiary grounds. The difficulty is not merely that their 
the article misleadingly clusters together a near menagerie of eighteenth-
century sources, European as well as American, under the legitimizing rubric 
of “what the Founders said.” Worse, when quoting eighteenth-century 
authors, the Article makes errors of omission and commission—neglecting 
passages that contradict its position and misreading the passages it recites.  
The goal here, however, is not merely historical, but conceptual. Rather 
than defend the nondelegation doctrine from unmerited historical attack, this 
Essay aims, on a more positive note, to reveal some fresh perspectives that 
both the defenders and the opponents of administrative power have yet to 
recognize. What is needed is not merely better history, but a 
reconceptualization of the debates over delegation and executive power. 
Part I argues that generic discussions of delegation should give way to 
a more accurate analysis in terms of vesting. Much evidence utilized by 
Mortenson and Bagley does not support, and often contradicts, their pro-
delegation conclusions. But the nondelegation doctrine should be put aside 
on other grounds—namely, that the Constitution speaks of vested rather than 
delegated powers. Although nondelegation has strong foundations in early 
political theory, the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine has weak 
foundations in the Constitution, because the Constitution speaks instead in 
much stronger terms about vesting. The Constitution vests legislative powers 
in Congress, and that body therefore cannot vest in others, or divest itself of, 
the powers that the Constitution vests in it.5 Accordingly, generic questions 
about delegation must be understood, in the context of the Constitution, to 
involve more specific concerns about vesting. 
 
 3 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 3, 22, 31. 
 4  Ilan Wurman, N o Nondelegation at the Founding? Not So Fast, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/no-nondelegation-at-the-founding-not-so-fast-
by-ilan-wurman/ [https://perma.cc/2X78-B7W8]; Aaron Gordon, A Rebuttal to ‘Delegation at the 
Founding’ (July 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Rob Natelson, How Much Power 
May Congress Delegate to Federal Agencies?, INDEP. INST. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://i2i.org/how-much-
power-may-congress-delegate-to-federal-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/W994-KEF5]; see also Christopher 
J. Walker, The Mortenson-Bagley-Wurman Debate on Nondelegation and Originalism, YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-mortenson-bagley-wurman-
debate-on-nondelegation-and-originalism/ [https://perma.cc/263J-4229]. 
 5 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
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Part II then suggests a more accurate understanding of executive power 
as the nation’s action, strength, or force. Recent scholarship has debated 
widely different conceptions of executive power—Mortenson’s view, now 
echoed by Bagley, being that it is an “empty vessel,” which is open to 
delegation.6 But recent scholarship tends to ignore a central conception of 
executive power—as the nation’s action, strength, or force. This 
understanding has deep foundations in eighteenth-century thought, not least 
in the authors quoted by Mortenson and Bagley.7 Indeed, it is the conception 
asserted by Federalist No. 78 and evident in the Constitution.8 
Finally, Part III observes the failure of Mortenson and Bagley to engage 
with the constitutional arguments on the other side and invites a more 
relevant debate. Although my work has rejected any reliance on 
nondelegation as a doctrine, the Mortenson and Bagley article oddly singles 
out my scholarship for defending the nondelegation doctrine.9 In fact, this 
Essay’s claims about vesting and divesting and about executive force have 
both appeared in my prior writing, and the divesting argument was picked 
up by Justice Gorsuch in Gundy v. United States.10 Nonetheless, the 
Mortenson and Bagley article does not even acknowledge these key 
arguments, let alone respond to them. If the debate were really still the same 
as in the 1930s, the Article would be on point. But the debate has been 
shifting in recent years, and the Article’s failure to recognize and confront 
current ideas about vesting and divesting and about executive force leaves 
the impression that it is an assault more on the dead than on the living. This 
Essay, in short, proposes a reconceptualized debate—one that engages with 
the Constitution’s long misunderstood but crucial principles of vesting and 
executive power.  
I. NOT DELEGATION, BUT DIVESTING 
 Does the Constitution really permit congressional delegation of 
legislative powers? Notwithstanding the Mortenson and Bagley article, the 
 
 6 Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2019) (arguing that “the first sentence of Article II would have been 
understood as vesting the wholly derivative authority to execute the laws, and nothing else” and surveying 
alternatives); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 4, 38, 40. 
 7 See infra Part II.A. For prior discussion of this idea, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW UNLAWFUL? 332–36 (2014).   
 8 See infra Part II.B. 
 9 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 15–16, 79 n.286.  
 10 See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Accepting, then, that we have 
an obligation to decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of its legislative 
responsibilities, the question follows: What’s the test? . . . [W]e apply the major questions doctrine in 
service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring 
that power to an executive agency.”).  
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historical evidence does not support any such conclusion. Indeed, the 
Constitution suggests that one should focus not merely on generic questions 
about delegation and nondelegation, but more specifically on vesting and 
divesting.  
A. Really “What the Founders Said”? 
The Article’s main conceptual framework comes in an account of “what 
the Founders said.”11 But does it really offer evidence about what the 
Founders said? 
 
Delegation. On the question of whether legislative power could be 
delegated, the Article relies on curiously few statements from the framing 
and ratification of the Constitution. For example, the Article relies on two 
James Wilson quotations from after ratification about the people’s initial 
delegation of power to the legislature—as if the people’s delegation of their 
powers meant that their legislature could subdelegate such powers!12 
Although the Article offers one Wilson quotation from the Pennsylvania 
ratification convention, that passage addresses the English constitution in the 
sixteenth century and actually suggests criticism of legislative delegation.13 
The Article also quotes James Kent during ratification speaking critically of 
delegation under the English constitution.14 These are the only statements 
 
 11 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 21. 
 12 The Article quotes Justice James Wilson’s lectures on society’s transfer of powers to government 
as if this were dispositive about any subdelegation. Id. at 27 (“All these powers and rights, indeed, cannot, 
in a numerous and extended society, be exercised personally; but they may be exercised by representation. 
One of those powers and rights is to make laws for the government of the nation. This power and right 
may be delegated for a certain period, on certain conditions, under certain limitations, and to a certain 
number of persons.”) (quoting James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE 
JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 3, 190 (1804)). The Article also quotes Justice Wilson’s lectures on the chain of 
representation—again, as if this were dispositive. Id. at 29 (“[r]epresentation is the chain of 
communication between the people and those, to whom they have committed the important charge of 
exercising the delegated powers necessary for the administration of publick affairs. This chain may consist 
of one link, or of more links than one; but it should always be sufficiently strong and discernible.”) 
(quoting Wilson, supra, at 430).  
 13 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 29, 29 n.104 (“So that when that body [Parliament] was so 
base and treacherous to the rights of the people as to transfer the legislative authority to Henry VIII, his 
exercising that authority by proclamations and edicts could not strictly speaking be termed 
unconstitutional.”).  
 14 Id. at 30–31, n.111 (“[T]he people even under Henry the 8th were insensible to the importance of 
their voice in parliament, . . . and the House was composed of a most abject set of slaves, who by a single 
act the most extraordinary that ever was recorded, conferred on the King’s proclamations the force of 
law.”) (quoting James Kent, A Country Federalist, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J. (1787), reprinted in 19 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 434 (John P. Kaminski, 
Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber, & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 2003)).  
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from the framing and ratification that appear in the Article’s nineteen pages 
on “what the Founders said” about delegation.15 Really, that’s all there is. 
So, the Article’s central evidence consists of two quotations from the 
framing and ratification that do not support the Article’s claim about 
delegation. Indeed, to the extent they suggest anything, they tend (as noted 
above in italics) to cut against that claim. 
To be sure, the Article quotes several other early Americans. In 
particular, it quotes Aequus, Benjamin Franklin, James Otis, and Daniel 
Shute in the 1750s and 1760s,16 and Thomas Jefferson arguing against 
delegation in the early 1780s.17 But each of these individuals were writing in 
circumstances very different from ratification in the late 1780s and on 
questions very different from congressional delegation under the U.S. 
Constitution.18 The only other quotations are from a few court cases in the 
1880s and 1890s.19 
Recognizing the limited American evidence—let alone from the 
framing and ratification of the Constitution—the Article admits: “While the 
total number of instances is not large, scattered references . . . can be found 
in the colonial, framing, and ratification records.”20 That’s right. In the end, 
the American sources are “scattered references,” and as already hinted, those 
actually from the framing or ratification (by Wilson and Kent) do not support 
the argument. 
Everything else in the nineteen pages on “what the Founders said” about 
the delegation of legislative power comes from Europeans.21 Of course, prior 
European thought, if correctly understood, can be very revealing. But it is 
important to be clear at the outset that the Founders and their European 
forbears are not the same. 
 
 15 Id. at 21–39.  
 16 The Article quotes Aequus on the delegation of legislative power to the colonies, id. at 29; Franklin 
on the delegation of local power to municipal corporations, id. at 30, n.108; Otis on colonial governance, 
id. at 37; and Shute on the community’s initial delegation to government. Id. at 37. 
 17 Id. at 37 (“Thomas Jefferson, for example, savaged legislative proposals to create a dictatorship 
during the revolutionary war by arguing that the ‘laws [of nature] forbid the abandonment of [legislative 
responsibility], even on ordinary occasions; and much more a transfer of their powers into other hands 
and other forms, without consulting the people.’”) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE 
OF VIRGINIA 135 (Univ. N.C. 2006) (1788), https://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/jefferson/jefferson.html 
[https://perma.cc/4T4J-DEKF]). 
 18 See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.   
 19 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 20 Id. at 37. 
 21 Some of the European scholarship on which the Article relies includes the works of Montesquieu, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, William Blackstone, William Burgh, Algernon Sidney, and David 
Hume, among others. Id. at 25–34. 
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What is one to make of this? The Article goes out of its way to critique 
my work for relying so much on European sources,22 but when explaining 
what the Founders said about delegation, it relies heavily on European and 
other indirect evidence.23 In fact, there is no evidence actually on point from 
the framing and ratification in the Article. 
Though it is tempting to suggest that scholars in European glass houses 
should hesitate before throwing stones, this would be a distraction from more 
serious points. Professors Mortenson and Bagley are to be commended for 
relying so extensively on European theory, for this can often be useful for 
understanding the Constitution, but in sweeping so much under the rug of 
“what the Founders said,” their work goes awry. It conflates Americans with 
Europeans, and what Americans said during the framing and ratification with 
what they said in earlier circumstances. It thus founders in expounding the 
Founders. 
 
Articles of Confederation. Evidentiary problems persist when the 
Article argues that rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization is an 
exercise of executive power.24 Though the Article purports to be proving 
“what the Founders said,” its evidence is based almost entirely on the powers 
of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 
To be sure, one could describe American leaders under the Articles as 
“Founders,” but the effect is to conflate what was said then about the 
Continental Congress with what was said later about the Congress 
established by the U.S. Constitution. What was said about one set of 
problems is thus taken as evidence about a very different set of issues. 
The Articles of Confederation were a treaty or contract among the 
states.25 Thus, the Articles were not a constitutional law, and they did not 
authorize the Continental Congress to make law. Instead, as the Articles 
repeatedly revealed, the Continental Congress only had authority to make 
“determinations”—a euphemism for decisions that were not really statutes.26 
Even formal congressional acts under the Articles did not have legal 
obligation.27 Eventually, James Madison became so frustrated with this that 
 
22 See id. at 15. 
23 Id. at 25–34. 
24 See id. at 39.  
25 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (establishing a “firm league of friendship” between 
the states). 
 26 Id. at art. XIII, para. 1. (“Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in 
Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them.”). 
 27 This is why the Articles ended with the delegates reciting: “[A]nd we do further solemnly plight 
and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the 
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he claimed that congressional determinations, especially congressional 
requisitions to the states for revenue, should be understood as “a law to the 
States”—an argument that did not persuade the states, or even his ally 
Alexander Hamilton, but that Mortenson and Bagley take as evidence that 
the Continental Congress enjoyed legislative power.28 Far from proving that 
Congress had legislative power, their reliance on this Madison quotation 
confirms the opposite conclusion. 
Congress, in contrast, was established by the U.S. Constitution with 
only legislative powers.29 This is not a surprise, as it was adopted precisely 
to reject the Articles of Confederation and its misbegotten Continental 
Congress. What, then, is the relevance of that old congress? 
Rather than face this problem, the Article uses discussions of the 
Continental Congress to suggest the fluidity of legislative and executive 
power under the U.S. Constitution.30 To this end, it even argues that the 
Continental Congress enjoyed all three powers of government, including 
legislative power.31 But that is exactly what the Continental Congress did not 
have. Though some Americans strained to attribute legislative power to that 
Congress, the Articles of Confederation only gave the Congress elements of 
executive and judicial powers. The Continental Congress therefore cannot 
supply evidence about the delegation of legislative power. 
Whether in relying on American discussions of the Continental 
Congress or European delegation theory, the Article makes the mistake of 
trying to reduce these sources to “what the Founders said.” In other words, 
it squeezes all sorts of quotations into what looks like a relevant pigeonhole 
 
United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by the said confederation are submitted to 
them.” Id. at art. XIII, para. 2. In 1787, it was observed that, “in no case, is Congress invested . . . with 
legislative or judicial powers: And the reason is evident; the Confederation was not intended by any 
means to consolidate the several states into one general Commonwealth.” Grand Committee, 
Observations Upon the Seven Articles, N.Y. GAZETTEER (Jan 29, 1787), reprinted in 31 VA. INDEP. 
CHRON. (Feb. 21, 1787) (on file with author). 
 28 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 51. For Hamilton’s views, see id. at 52. 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 30 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 43 (arguing that those discussions “make nonsense of 
originalist claims that government action must be neatly slotted under a single font of government 
authority. Depending on the relationships you focused on, a given act could properly be classified as both 
legislative and executive at the same time”).  
 31 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 43 (“[T]he Articles government was commonly understood 
to possess all three powers of a complete government—albeit in notoriously ineffective form.”). In 
claiming legislative power for the Continental Congress, the Article merely quotes the power of Congress 
under the Articles to establish rules for deciding capture and prize cases. Id. at 44, n.150. But such rules 
were more typically binding on foreigners than Americans, and Congress did not have general binding 
domestic legislative power. To get over the reality that the Congressional Congress lacked legislative 
power, the Article says that it was “commonly understood to possess” such power. Id. at 43. But that was 
not the reality, as the authors appear to understand. 
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without sorting out exactly why such evidence may or may not be relevant. 
The result is a combination of inflated claims and weak evidence, which does 
not inspire confidence. 
B. Nondelegation Theory 
On the assumption that European theory is relevant, how should it be 
understood? As recognized by the Article’s focus on John Locke and 
Thomas Rutherforth, English theory may be of particular importance for 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. It is therefore disturbing that in 
expounding European theory—the bulk of the Article’s evidence on whether 
legislative power could be delegated—the Mortenson and Bagley article 
goes astray. It looks for a uniform distinction between revocable and 
irrevocable transfers of power and thereby misreads the very sources on 
which it most relies. 
 
Revocable vs. Irrevocable. The Article recognizes that many early 
political theorists, notably John Locke, argued against any legislative 
alienation or transfer of legislative power.32 But rather than acknowledge that 
Locke and many others worried about all sorts of legislative shifts of 
legislative power, the Article argues that there was a pervasive distinction 
between revocable and irrevocable grants.33 
The Article contends that words such as “alienate” and “transfer” had a 
fixed technical meaning in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European 
theory. Allegedly, these terms referred to irrevocable assignments of power, 
and in contrast, the term “delegation” referred only to revocable shifts of 
power.34 On this basis, it is said that Locke did not object to delegation—
meaning a revocable transfer of legislative power—but only rejected 
irrevocable transfers of legislative power.35 The Article concludes that the 
U.S. Constitution should be read to permit Congress to shift its power as it 
pleases as long as Congress can recall the power. As now will be seen, 
however, the Article’s assumptions about European theory are dubious. 
 
 
 32 Id. at 30–31. 
 33 Id. at 31. 
 34 Id. at 32–34. 
 35 Id. at 31. (“Far from reflecting some pervasive view that legislative power could not be delegated, 
the founding-era evidence thus indicates the opposite. That didn’t necessarily have to mean, however, 
that legislatures were unconstrained in their disposition of rulemaking authority. A small handful of 
writers did argue for one specific limitation, albeit one different in kind from modern nondelegation 
doctrine. On the account of those who took this view, what was prohibited was legislatures’ permanent 
alienation of legislative power without right of reversion or control. The best-known exposition of this 
anti-alienation principle was probably Section 141 of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government.”).  
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Contested Concepts. The claim that there was a single pervasive view 
about delegation across early Europe already suggests more than a little 
overstatement. The Article finds an unvarying distinction between revocable 
and irrevocable shifts of power from the time of Locke to the era of the 
Constitution, observing that “writers, lawyers, and politicians repeatedly 
surfaced the same distinction.”36 In this, however, the Article fails to observe 
the degree to which, from the seventeenth through the eighteenth century, 
there was disagreement about what could be delegated, and that this 
disagreement concerned both levels of delegation: the initial delegation of 
power from the people and any subsequent possible delegation from the 
bodies in which the people placed their power. 
The failure to recognize the range of disagreement is particularly 
disappointing because it misses the extent to which in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century England there was widespread, though not complete, 
distrust of an unlimited power of delegation to, or within, government. 
From the monarchical perspective, there certainly were limits on 
delegation. In at least some monarchical theory, the people could and 
perhaps had to delegate their power to the monarch, and once they had 
conceded power to him, they arguably could not withdraw it. And some of 
the monarch’s prerogatives—such as the pardon power—were so inherently 
personal that he could not alienate them.37 
From a more popular point of view—most notably elaborated by John 
Locke and later picked up by Americans—the people, by the law of nature, 
could not delegate so much power as to give up their right of self-
preservation.38 In other words, they could not irrevocably dispose of their 
powers. But that was not all. When, by means of the Constitution, the people 
established their legislature, the legislature had no authority to alter their 
constitution and therefore could not delegate its power.39 Of course, there 
were yet other perspectives, but these monarchical and more popular visions 
should suffice here to suggest the range of possibilities. 
Tellingly, neither political party in England was so devoted to any point 
of view as to be unwilling to shift gears when it suited them. By means of 
the 1716 Septennial Act, a Whig Parliament elected for three years extended 
its own life to seven years.40 The three-year Parliament was thereby 
 
 36 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 36. 
 37 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 380–82. 
 38 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 429 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1960) (1690). Here and in subsequent quotations from Locke, capitalization and italics are modernized, 
except where they seem to illuminate the argument.  
 39 See infra text accompanying notes 48–49.  
 40 Septennial Act 1716, 2 Geo. 1 c. 38 (Eng.). 
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understood to have delegated its power to a seven-year Parliament—a 
delegation that remained revocable until the end of Parliament’s initial, three 
year term. The delegation prompted at least one Tory to quote John Locke 
against any delegation. Reciting Locke’s familiar assumption that “[t]he 
power of the legislative” was “derived from the people by a positive 
voluntary grant and institution,” John Snell—a Tory from Gloucester—
further quoted that the “legislative,” meaning the legislature, “can be no 
other[] than what that positive grant conveyed” and that “the legislative can 
have no power of transferring their authority of making laws, and place it in 
other hands.”41 Though this suggests some hypocrisy, it more interestingly 
reveals the degree to which principles against any sort of legislative 
delegation were widely familiar, even among those who would not ordinarily 
be identified with such a perspective. 
Thus, even before one gets to the particular European theorists most 
relied upon by the Article, it is important to recognize just how implausible 
it is for the Article to suggest a monolithic European view on delegation. 
There were diverse points of view, which recognized the varied 
circumstances in which power was delegated. For example, not only was the 
people’s delegation distinguishable from their legislature’s delegation but 
also the legislature’s delegation of local legislative power to a municipal 
corporation or colony could be differentiated from its delegation of national 
legislative power.42 In each of these circumstances, Europeans could and did 
disagree. It is therefore deeply confused, and apt to lead to a misreading of 
sources, to assume a unity of thought.43 
 
John Locke. Consider Locke’s Two Treatises of Government—a crucial 
text for early Americans.44 As already noted by Professor Wurman, Locke at 
 
 41 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 382.  
 42 Id. at 388–89 (regarding municipal power). 
43 In a mirror image of its peculiar claim of a near-consensus permitting delegation, the Article 
claims that those who disagree must show a near consensus against delegation: “For originalists to carry 
their argument, the historical evidence ought to show that most everyone at the founding would have 
understood the Constitution to bar the delegation of too much power or power of the wrong kind.” 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 22. Really, “most everyone”? Good grief. Just to illustrate how 
wrongheaded this is, consider that the Constitution, being adopted merely by majorities, often gave 
effect to contested ideas, which it presented in contested language. Though the majorities might prevail 
in establishing their ideas in their phrasing, it should be no surprise that this engendered further disputes 
about the words and their meaning. It is therefore very odd to claim that anyone who disagrees with the 
Article must show a near-consensus, and this is especially comic as the Article’s own evidence is not 
only weak, but often cuts against its thesis.  
44 For a brief sampling of the scholarship, see John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and 
America in the Eighteenth Century, in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN 
POLITICAL THEORY 53 (2002); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, 
LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE 
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least sometimes clearly meant a revocable delegation when he wrote against 
the “transfer” of legislative power.45 But the evidence goes much further.  
Elsewhere in his book, Locke squarely addressed the question of 
delegation and wrote in unmistakable terms: “freedom of men under 
government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of 
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it.”46 That is, the 
rules governing society had to be made by the legislature erected by the 
people. Locke also wrote: “The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no 
other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the common-
wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what 
that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.”47 Such ideas 
resonated with Americans.48 
Indeed, Locke explained that governments are “dissolved from within” 
when “the legislative”—meaning the legislature—is “altered”: 
The Constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, 
whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the 
direction of persons, and bonds of laws made by persons authorized to 
thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one 
man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws, that 
should be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to 
make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws 
without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey.49 
The dissolution of government was, of course, the opportunity for revolution, 
and Locke’s first example of this situation was when laws are made by 
persons who are not appointed as lawmakers by the people. 
It is therefore passing strange to claim that Locke’s principles left room 
for a legislature to transfer legislative power to other bodies, as long as the 
 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA (1995); C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, AMERICA’S 
REVOLUTIONARY MIND: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE DECLARATION 
THAT DEFINED IT 21–37 (2019); Merle Curti, The Great Mr. Locke: America’s Philosopher, 1783–
1861, HUNTINGTON LIBR. BULL. 107 (1937).  
 45 Wurman, supra note 4 (“Mortenson and Bagley’s entire argument about Locke is that he was 
arguing that the people delegated their power to the legislature and did not alienate their power, as 
absolutists like Jean Bodin had argued. And now we see that in section 135, when Locke is talking about 
this original delegation (not alienation), he uses the word ‘transfer.’ In section 135, then, ‘transfer’ means 
delegation, not alienation.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 46 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 302. 
 47 Id. 
 48 For a hint as to how such ideas were studied by Americans, note that the first quotation in the 
paragraph above was copied out in 1778, with other passages from Locke, by George Gilmer, an 
American officer in Virginia. GEORGE GILMER, COMMONPLACE BOOK 122–23, 132 (before May 1778), 
Virginia Historical Society, Mss 5:5, G4213:1. 
 49 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 425–26.  
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transfer was revocable. His principles clearly barred any shift in legislative 
power. 
And, of course, this was the most famous eighteenth-century 
application of Locke’s theory about the shifting of legislative power. Recall 
the debates about the 1716 Septennial Act, in which even a Tory quoted John 
Locke against a revocable parliamentary delegation.50 If an early eighteenth-
century member of Parliament, not to mention Locke himself, understood 
the philosopher’s principles to bar a revocable legislative delegation, perhaps 
one might hesitate before ardently insisting that Locke opposed only 
irrevocable alienations of legislative power. 
 
Thomas Rutherforth. It would be more tedious than difficult to review 
and question the relevance of every quotation deployed by the Article against 
nondelegation,51 but it is worth examining the treatment of Thomas 
Rutherforth. This eighteenth-century English natural law theorist was 
unusually sophisticated, and the Article relies upon him second only to 
Locke.52 
Although the Article quotes Rutherforth repeatedly on the transfer of 
royal power, it only once quotes him on legislative power: 
It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common understanding, 
or joint sense of the body politic, to determine and direct what is right to be 
done: and it belongs to the executive power, considered as the common or joint 
strength of the same body, to carry what is so determined and directed into 
execution.53 
From this, the Article concludes: “On this historical understanding, agency 
rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization would qualify as an exercise 
of executive power, for the simple but decisive reason that the agency is 
carrying out legislative instructions.”54 But that is the opposite of 
Rutherforth’s point. When saying that it belongs to the legislative power to 
“determine and direct what is right to be done,” he is speaking of rules 
governing society, not instructions to agencies to legislate.  
Reinforcing this point is Rutherforth’s vision of internal executive 
power as a matter of law execution. In his view, the legislature adjusts and 
 
 50 See supra text accompanying notes 41–42. 
 51 For doubts about the relevance of most of the European and American quotations that appear in 
the text of the Article’s section on the delegation of legislative power, see supra notes 12–18.  
 52 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 34–36 (discussing 1 T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF 
NATURAL LAW, BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 
318, 320 (1754–56)). 
 53 Id.  at 40.  
 54 Id. at 41. 
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settles the rights of members of the society and therefore determines when 
persons have a right to law enforcement, which is much of the internal 
version of executive power:  
Now, as the legislative power adjusts and settles the rights of the several 
members of a civil society, it naturally belongs to this power to determine how 
far, and upon what occasions, they shall have a right to the interposition of the 
common force; that is, it naturally belongs to this power to direct the use and 
extent of the internal executive power.55  
In other words, Rutherforth’s understanding that it belongs to the legislature 
to “adjust[] and settle[] the rights of the several members of a civil society” 
goes hand in hand with his law-execution view of domestic executive power. 
There is little room in such a perspective for agency lawmaking. 
What, then, can be said about the Article’s treatment of the leading 
English theorists of nondelegation? The Article surely is correct in focusing 
on Locke and Rutherforth.56 But whether it reads these theorists correctly is 
another matter. 
C. The Value of Nondelegation 
The risks of misreading Locke go beyond the history of ideas. There is 
also a danger of not understanding why a nondelegation principle, or 
something like it, still matters in today’s world. 
 
A Historical and Living Principle. Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s 
arguments against the nondelegation doctrine tend to ignore why such a 
doctrine might continue to be valuable. So, it is important to spell this out. 
One reason is that nondelegation keeps the legislative power in the hands of 
elected lawmakers and thus preserves the foundation of law in popular 
consent. A second reason is that if the people delegate their legislative power 
to the legislature, and that body can subdelegate its power to other bodies, 
then the servant can almost effortlessly subvert its masters’ constitutional 
choice. On both grounds, there have long been ideals, at least in England and 
America, against subdelegation. 
The second of these arguments against subdelegation—that it preserves 
the people’s constitutional choices—deserves special attention in an essay 
on constitutional law, and revealingly it was fully developed already in the 
early seventeenth-century arguments against monarchical delegation of 
 
 55 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 274. 
 56 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31–33 (discussing LOCKE, supra note 38); id. at 34–36 
(discussing RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52). 
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personal prerogatives.57 Toward the end of the century it was also employed 
to argue against legislative delegation.58 It is therefore troubling that the no-
nondelegation position misstates the seventeenth-century theory—not 
because that theory is determinative, but rather because a correct 
understanding of the theory illuminates why nondelegation, or something 
like it, is essential for preserving the people’s constitutional choices. Even if 
there had never been such a principle, one might be inclined to invent it. It 
is, in this sense, not merely a historical ideal, but one of continuing vitality—
dare one say, a living principle? 
From this perspective, it is important to examine Locke’s reasoning in 
more detail, for it remains relevant as a still vital response to an enduring 
problem. Locke was a philosopher rather than a lawyer, and his argument 
aimed to preserve the people’s choice of constitutional structure, particularly 
their formation of the “legislative.” 
He argued that “the constitution of the legislative” was “the original and 
supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending 
wholly on the people,” and therefore “no inferior power can alter it.”59 More 
specifically, he argued that the people’s delegation of legislative power to 
the legislative body precluded that body from transferring its power: “The 
legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. For 
it being but a delegated power from the people, they, who have it, cannot 
pass it over to others.”60 
Locke argued that this principle followed not simply from their 
constitution, but also from the nature of constitutions: 
The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth . . . . And when 
the people have said, we will submit to rules, and be govern’d by laws made by 
such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws 
for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by 
those, whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them.61 
On these assumptions about constitutional law—not to mention underlying 
ideas about consent under “the law of God and nature”—there could be no 
 
 57 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 380–81 (discussing advisory opinion from 1605 on delegation of 
royal dispensing power). 
 58 See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 59 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 3991 quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 26–28. 
 60 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 380 quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31. 
 61 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 380–81, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31. Locke 
continued: “The power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and 
institution, can be no other, than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and 
not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and 
place it in other hands.” LOCKE, supra note 38, at 381. 
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subdelegation: “The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of 
making laws to any body else, or place it any where but where the people 
have.”62 Locke’s reasoning was broad, and it led to the clear conclusion that 
the legislature could not “place” its lawmaking power “any where but where 
the people have.”63 
This principle and the underlying logic remain as pertinent today as in 
the past. If laws are to be made with the people’s consent, they must be 
enacted, without delegation, by the elected body established by the people as 
their legislature. And if the legislature established by a constitution can 
delegate its power, then, notwithstanding the people’s constitutional choices, 
the legislature can substitute its own. 
 
Implausible Results. Reinforcing the value of a nondelegation principle 
is the sheer implausibility of the Article’s open rejection of the nondelegation 
doctrine in favor of generally unfettered congressional delegation. Such a 
position is both too feeble and too bold. 
It is too feeble because the current nondelegation doctrine, which 
employs the intelligible principle standard, already allows Congress to 
delegate almost as much as it wishes. Although the doctrine purports to bar 
the delegation of legislative power, it permits an agency to bind Americans 
as long as Congress guides the agency with an intelligible principle.64 The 
result, in reality, is to permit delegation, subject to a minimal degree of 
congressional process, not any substantive limit. It is therefore unclear how 
an open abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine would make much of a 
difference. Certainly, it would not solve the problem faced by judges when 
attempting to figure out what can be delegated and what cannot. 
It is also too bold because it would candidly permit much that would be 
absurd. Thus far, the nondelegation doctrine has permitted what, in fact, is 
delegation of legislative power—at least to federal departments and other 
agencies.65 But if there were no nondelegation doctrine, could Congress 
delegate legislative power not merely to agencies but to the President, so that 
he personally would make rules binding on Americans? In this eventuality, 
the President alone—without expertise and, if Congress wishes, unrestrained 
by any procedures—could make binding rules or laws. Legislative power 
would thus be in the hands of the very person in whom the Constitution 
places the veto, and a sort of partial veto would be in the legislature, thus 
 
 62 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 363, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31 n.113. 
 63 LOCKE, supra note 38, at 363, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31 n.113. 
 64 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404 (1928). 
65 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1226 (2015) (holding Amtrak to be a 
governmental agency and leaving undecided the fate of regulations by private entities). 
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inverting the Constitution’s structure. Indeed, if there were no nondelegation 
doctrine, then Congress could delegate its legislative power to private bodies, 
even perhaps to my Great Aunt Gertrude.66 To state these consequences of 
the permissive view of delegation is to refute it. 
D. Early Federal Practices 
Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s final argument in justification of 
delegation rests on early federal practices. Again, the Article engages in 
some conflation. In this instance, it relies on examples from Parliament,67 the 
colonies,68 state legislatures,69 and the Continental Congress70 before getting 
to the first Congress. But more to the point, it misunderstands what Congress 
did and fails to mention what Congress did not do. 
 
What Congress Did. The Article recounts a host of practices authorized 
by early federal statutes. Of course, there is nothing unfamiliar about these 
practices, which are discussed in the prior literature, including my own.71 
But, as is conventional in scholarship supporting administrative power, they 
are upheld as examples of the delegation of legislative power, primarily to 
the executive. 
These practices include the following:  
• Determinations of facts (including tax assessments, customs  
determinations, and presidential determinations under conditional  
statutes)72 
 
66 The Article’s vision of the breadth of congressional power to delegate is evident from its account 
of how early “regulatory delegations were limited only by the will and judgment of the legislature.” 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 61. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at 67–68. 
 69 Id. at 62–63. 
 70 Id. at 63–67. 
 71 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 79–81 (suspending and dispensing); id. at 85–89 
(executive regulations, instructions, and orders); id. at 89–95 (executive interpretation); id. at 95–97 
(military orders); id. at 100–02 (determinations); id. at 104–07 (licensing regulations); id. at 107–110 
(determinations of facts); id. at 192–93 (executive adjudication concerning nonsubjects); id. at 193–203 
(executive adjudication concerning benefits or other privileges); id. at 203–05, 208–11 (executive 
adjudication as a means of determining and giving notice of duties); id. at 211–15 (executive role of 
judges); id. at 215–17 (coercive and other physical acts by executive officers); id. at 217–19 (nonbinding 
orders and warrants); id. at 220–22 (executive orders to appear, testify, or produce records); id. at 222–
24 (reporting, record keeping, and inspection). 
 72 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 83–85 (tax assessments); id. at 84 (paying duties or bonds 
to the satisfaction of customs inspector); id. at 99 (presidential determinations under conditional statutes). 
But factual determinations were permitted only in narrow circumstances and were understood to involve 
discretion in the sense of judgment rather than lawmaking will. HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 100–02 
(determinations); id. at 107–10 (determinations of facts). 
115:88 (2020) Delegating or Divesting? 
105 
• Executive inspection and seizure (notably by customs officers)73  
• The selection of locations (for post offices, post roads, and district 
boundaries)74  
• Delegated legislation in federal enclaves where Congress enjoys local  
power (such as the District of Columbia and the territories)75  
• Executive rulemaking regarding the distribution of various benefits  
and other privileges (ranging from pensions to patents)76   
• Executive licensing regulation of trade with Indian tribes.77 
 
 73 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 84–85 (executive inspection and seizure by customs 
officers). But these were executive acts conducted under statutory authorization. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, 
supra note 7, at 222–24 (inspections). 
 74 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 95 (post offices); id. at 92–94 (post roads); id. at 96 (district 
boundaries). But the Constitution does not clearly make the specification of such locations a matter of 
legislative power. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish Post 
Offices and post Roads”) (emphasis added). 
 75 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 72–75 (delegating legislation in federal enclaves where 
Congress enjoyed local power such as the District of Columbia and the territories). But far from revealing 
that Congress may delegate its power to the national Executive, the treatment of these places merely 
shows that Congress could recognize the power of the people in these localities to govern themselves 
through local bodies. HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 389. Incidentally, Professors Mortenson and Bagley 
interpret the Constitution to give Congress authority to “exercise exclusive legislation [in the capital 
district] in all cases whatsoever”—meaning, in their view, that the Constitution “prohibit[s] delegations 
of legislative power.” Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 73.  They never pause to consider that the 
Constitution thereby aimed to give Congress a legislative power exclusive of the states. HAMBURGER, 
supra note 7, at 389. 
 76 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 80–82 (pensions); id. at 75 (patents). But these, at least 
formally, were privileges, not binding regulations. See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 193–203 (executive 
adjudication concerning benefits or other privileges, including patents). 
 77 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 77–78. According to Professors Mortenson and Bagley, my 
work “dismisses” the licensing regulation of Indian traders “for the curious reason that ‘persons, such as 
Indian traders, were not entirely subject to domestic law.’” Id. at 79, n.286. They then respond that “it’s 
a tautology that a nation’s laws do not apply to someone not subject to those laws.” Id. But it only seems 
a tautology because Mortenson and Bagley truncate my argument to the point of depriving it of its meat.  
 My argument was fundamentally about the limited reach of American law beyond the nation’s 
borders—about its limited reach as to “persons and things that, in various ways, went beyond the territory 
or shores of the United States.” HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 104. Adding to such concerns, Indian 
traders were persons not all of whom “considered themselves subjects of the United States, and even 
those who were subjects tended to venture into the territory of nations that often considered themselves 
distinct from the United States.” Id. The application of federal law in relation to Indian nations remains a 
complex question, and nothing about this is tautological. 
 The larger point is that Mortenson and Bagley take an exceptional situation involving cross-border 
conduct to be suggestive of what was normal in national regulation of domestic matters, and that is simply 
false. Yes, there was regulatory licensing of Indian traders and of a range of vessels, in which the 
Executive was authorized to frame regulatory conditions or rules regarding the availability of licenses. 
But, as I have pointed out, and Mortenson and Bagley do not deny, it is difficult to find early instances in 
which Congress authorized the Executive to regulate nationally in domestic matters by specifying 
licensing conditions. Id. at 107; PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 48–49 (2017). 
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My scholarship has already explained why these are not instances of 
delegated legislative power.78 Here, it is enough to observe that these 
instances do not really support Mortenson and Bagley’s position. 
One might argue that even if the Article’s list of early federal practices 
reveals some delegation, it should be no surprise that practices sometimes 
depart from principles. On this obvious assumption, one should not discount 
the Constitution’s principles because of minor or occasional deviations. Nor 
should one expand such deviations into exceptions or counter principles that 
swallow the rule. But true as all of this may be, none of it is the main 
objection to Mortenson and Bagley’s reliance on early federal practices. 
 
Constraints on Private Persons vs. Legal Obligation. Before getting to 
the main objection, it is important to avoid getting tripped up by a conceptual 
mistake—which the Article correctly attributes to many originalists79 but 
should not attribute to me—namely, that what the Executive could not do 
was to affect private conduct or alter private rights. From this perspective, it 
makes sense that the Executive in the early years of the Republic did not 
make binding rules or adjudications. At the same time, it is puzzling from 
this point of view that, even with statutory authorization, the Executive made 
determinations of facts (tax assessments, customs determinations, and 
presidential determinations) and that it imposed executive inspection and 
seizure (mostly by customs officers).80 It is also puzzling from this point of 
view that executive regulations were not binding on executive officers, but 
could be enforced merely by dismissing uncooperative officers.81 
Yet none of this is much of a mystery if one recognizes a different set 
of underlying assumptions: that a central element of legislative power is to 
make binding rules, that judicial power involves making binding 
adjudications, and that executive power is the nation’s action, strength, or 
force. On these foundations, it makes sense that the Executive made 
determinations, inspections, and searches, but not legally binding rules or 
adjudications. And it makes sense that executive regulations did not legally 
bind executive officers but could be enforced through removal. 
In other words, when the line between legislative power and executive 
power is drawn by barring the Executive from limiting private conduct or 
altering private rights, much gets lost. This is a crude summary of something 
 
 78 For brief hints of my prior explanations of such alleged instances of delegation, see infra notes 
79–85.  
 79 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 13, 16, 79 n.286. 
 80 See supra note 72.  
 81 See infra notes 84–86.  
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more interesting: that executive power is the nation’s force and does not 
include the power to create rules or adjudications with legal obligation. 
Having cleared this up, one can understand the real import of the early 
federal practices that, according to the Article, were delegations of legislative 
power. 
 
What Congress Did Not Do. What is missing from the Mortenson and 
Bagley article is what Congress did not do. To be precise, the Article does 
not point to any early instance when the Executive, with or without 
congressional authorization, made binding rules or adjudications that were 
national and domestic in their scope. None. Not one. 
In other words, the Article does not produce a single example of early 
federal executive action that falls squarely within the sort of national 
domestic regulation that is at the heart of the dispute over administrative 
power. Instead, it treats as legislative and judicial all sorts of actions that 
could reasonably be considered within the scope of executive power. Some 
actions (such as customs inspections and seizures or executive regulations 
instructing officers) were clearly within executive power, even if the 
inspections and seizures needed statutory authorization.82 Other actions (such 
as factual determinations) were ordinarily within executive power, and 
though they occasionally strayed into legislative territory, it should be no 
surprise that the typical assumption, that they were executive, generally 
prevailed.83  
Once one gets past the practices that were within executive power, the 
evidence becomes elusive. Where are the early federal examples of binding 
rules or adjudications that were national and domestic? They are difficult to 
discern. 
Consider the Treasury: The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton, was not shy about espousing expansive federal power. But a close 
examination of manuscript Treasury records (which I pursued for my book 
on administrative power) reveals that neither he nor his successors, until late 
in the nineteenth century, issued rules or other instructions that purported to 
impose legal obligation.84 For example, Hamilton and his subordinates issued 
copious rules and other instructions for customs officers, but even as to them, 
 
82 See supra note 72.  
83 See supra note 71. 
 84 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 86–88 (describing executive regulations, instructions, and orders 
directing officers, but that were not legally binding on them or the public—compliance being obtained 
only by threat of dismissal); id. at 89–95 (regarding executive interpretation directing subordinates within 
departments, but not legally binding on them or the public).  
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such rules and instructions were not legally binding.85 Instead, they were 
merely directions that were enforced with threats of dismissal.86 
So, please forgive a Hamburger for asking: Where’s the beef? Not in 
the Article. Not in other scholarship supportive of administrative power. And 
not in the very extensive early federal evidence I have studied.87 If there was 
a dog, isn’t it strange that it did not bark? 
E. Not Merely Delegation and Nondelegation, but Vesting and Divesting 
One of the curiosities of Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s Article is 
its assumption of direct continuity between European thought and American 
law—such that their misreading of European delegation theory becomes the 
Constitution’s delegation theory, without consideration of what the 
Constitution actually said. In fact, though the Constitution echoes Lockean 
anti-delegation principles, it uses different phrasing, thereby establishing its 
own distinctive version of the old nondelegation analysis. 
Rather than speak generically of delegation—let alone, alienation or 
transfer—the Constitution says “shall be vested.”88 Indeed, not once, nor 
twice, but three times, the Constitution vests its different powers in the 
different branches of government.89 It thereby speaks more forcefully than 
prior anti-delegation theories and does not leave its meaning to be implied 
from such theories. 
The nondelegation doctrine frames its limitation on transfers of power 
in terms that obscure the Constitution’s vesting principle. For one thing, the 
nondelegation doctrine leaves the impression that the limit on transfers of 
power is merely a matter of judicial doctrine, rather than the Constitution 
itself. This in turn invites speculation about the doctrine’s origins in pre-
constitutional European theory about delegation, which draws attention 
further away from the Constitution’s principle. Though pre-constitutional 
European theory about delegation is important for understanding the 
Constitution and the dangers of permitting shifts in power, the Constitution 
speaks more emphatically about vesting its powers.  
Thus, in the Constitution, the generic nondelegation principle becomes 
a more specific matter of vesting. This is not to say it is entirely wrong to 
 
 85 Id. at 86–87, 90–91, 93. 
 86 Id.  
 87 My book draws on a host of American sources, printed and manuscript, in much greater depth than 
the Article. Without always spelling this out in the text, the book makes use of extensive research on early 
federal statutes and regulations, early state manuscript records, and the mass of early manuscript Treasury 
records in the National Archives. 
 88 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, art. III, § 1. 
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generalize about the people’s delegation of legislative powers to Congress 
and the consequent nondelegation principle. Delegation was the language of 
much political theory, and the Constitution’s vesting language builds upon 
such theory. So, it is no surprise that Americans have always tended to talk 
about the problem in terms of delegation. But it is more accurate and specific 
to recognize that the people of the United States “vested” the nation’s 
legislative powers in Congress and thereby precluded Congress from vesting 
in others, or divesting itself of, such powers.90  
This reframing of the problem in the Constitution’s terms has many 
advantages. It places the solution on a more solid foundation than either 
earlier European ideas or later American judicial doctrine. It recognizes that 
the problem is not merely congressional, but general to all branches of 
government—that it arises whenever any power is hived off from any branch 
of government. And it avoids a strange inquiry into whether Congress can 
“delegate” judicial power to administrative agencies—as if Congress could 
delegate a power that does not belong to it. A nondelegation doctrine cannot 
speak to legislative transfers of judicial power. Therefore, it is fortunate that 
the Constitution recognizes that in such instances Congress is vesting in 
agencies, and divesting the courts of, the power that the Constitution vests in 
the courts. 
The inadequacy of delegation talk is especially clear because, when 
Congress transfers its powers, it cannot always recall them. A delegated 
power is one that can be resumed at the will or discretion of the delegator.91 
When the Secretary of the Interior, for example, delegates some of her 
powers to a subordinate, she can recall her power at her own discretion.92 
Similarly, when Congress delegates authority to the Congressional Budget 
Office, it has full discretion to retrieve any of the delegated authority. But 
when Congress authorizes the Executive to exercise legislative power, even 
if only temporarily, Congress cannot predictably recover that power, as it 
may have to overcome a Presidential veto.93 It thus becomes clear that 
congressional shifts of legislative power to the Executive cannot accurately 
be considered delegations—this being yet another reason why it is fitting that 
the Constitution speaks of vesting rather than delegating.  
 
 90 See Brief of The New Civil Liberties Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–10, 
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-6086), 2018 WL 2684383, [hereinafter NCLA 
Gundy Brief]. I am grateful to Jonathan Mitchell for bringing to my attention the point about discretion 
in delegation. 
 91 See id. at 6. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. 
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In sum, a focus on vesting more sharply delineates what is at stake. 
Although the Constitution could have simply echoed the old language about 
delegating powers, it instead more accurately and emphatically vested 
powers in the branches of government.94 And precisely because of the 
historical prevalence of delegation analysis, it is especially clear that the 
Constitution is not merely echoing delegation talk when focusing on vesting.  
This locution has at least two implications. First, because the 
Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, Congress cannot vest 
any such powers elsewhere. Second, Congress cannot divest itself of the 
powers that the Constitution vests in it. A full exposition of these points must 
await another publication. But even in this Essay, it should be possible to 
anticipate how much might flow from the Constitution’s use of language 
about vested powers in place of the more familiar language about delegated 
powers.  
II. NOT AN EMPTY VESSEL, BUT THE NATION’S ACTION, STRENGTH, OR 
FORCE 
One ordinarily might stop here, but in the course of justifying the 
delegation of legislative power, the Mortenson and Bagley article also says 
much about executive power. The Article proposes that the Constitution’s 
executive power was historically an “empty vessel.”95 It adds that this was a 
power to “execute law,” by which the Article means, however, the power of 
carrying out legislative authorizations or instructions.96 The definition of 
executive power thus seems to confirm the legitimacy of delegating 
legislative power.  
 To be precise, the Article argues that “[t]he founders unanimously 
understood executive power as the narrow but potent authority to carry out 
projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power,” and then quotes 
Rutherforth in support, as if he were a “founder.”97 On this sort of foundation, 
the Article claims that “the executive power was simply the power to execute 
the laws—an empty vessel for Congress to fill, rather than a subject matter 
category with a well-defined set of real-world referents.”98 Accordingly, “it’s 
not just confused but incoherent to ask whether an executive action is so 
legislative in nature as to fall outside of that basket. Any action authorized 
by law was an exercise of ‘executive power’ inasmuch as it served to execute 
 
 94 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
95 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 4. 
96 Id. (“[T]he executive power was simply the power to execute the laws—an empty vessel for 
Congress to fill.”). 
 97 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40–41 (emphasis added). 
 98 Id. at 4–5 (echoing an earlier article by Mortenson: Mortenson, supra note 6, at 1234). 
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the law.”99 It sounds like a powerful attack on nondelegation, but the 
foundation—the assumption about executive power—is rather shaky. 
A. Action, Strength, or Force 
Another definition, which was familiar in the eighteenth century, 
viewed executive power as a nation’s lawful action, strength, or force.  
This definition has deep foundations in European philosophy, which 
long distinguished between the two faculties of the soul or mind—will and 
judgment—and contrasted these with action, strength, or force, which was 
the faculty or capacity of the body.100 Indeed, these tripartite faculties of an 
individual became the basis for recognizing such powers—including 
executive action, strength, or force—in the people and ultimately in their 
government.101  
Executive power thus could be described simply as a nation’s force, in 
the sense of its physical actions, in contrast to its legislative will or its judicial 
judgments. Such force included not merely warfare, but all sorts of physical 
activity, including speech, the conduct of prosecutions in court, the 
enforcement of judgments, distraint, and the purchasing of supplies.102  
But the Article (and the earlier scholarship by Professor Mortenson on 
which it relies) does not really consider the possibility of lawful executive 
action, strength, or force. It is not even mentioned as a competing definition 
of executive power.103 
Strikingly, this old vision of executive power is plainly evident from 
one of the Article’s own quotations. The Article quotes Rousseau on the 
“body politic” to the effect that “force and will are distinguished, will under 
 
 99 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 5. 
 100 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 327. Will was alternatively understood as passion, and judgment 
as intellect or understanding. Force could be viewed as action or strength. For will and judgment, see 
NORMAN FIERING, MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HARVARD 106–09 (1981); PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 159–60 (2008); Dan D. Crawford, Intellect and Will in 
Augustine’s Confessions, 24 RELIGIOUS STUD. 291 (1988); Norman S. Fiering, Will and Intellect in the 
New England Mind, 29 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 523, 529–30 (1972). For force or what has been translated 
in Aquinas as the sovereign’s “coercive power,” including the coercion of law, see, for example, THOMAS 
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II.I, question 96, art. 5, at 2326 (Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
1981) (1274). 
 101 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 327. 
102 Of course, there was disagreement about the division of government powers, as some theorists 
considered the judicial power to be part of the executive power. But even these commentators—as evident 
from Locke and Rutherforth—could view executive power as the nation’s force. See infra notes 114,  124. 
103 Mortenson’s earlier work comes closest when it says that “executive power has never been 
anything less than the nation’s force mustered in service of the nation’s will.” Mortenson, supra note 6, 
1271. But this seems more a statement of realism than a recognition that executive power is defined as 
the nation’s lawful action, strength, or force.  
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the name of legislative power and force under that of executive power.”104 
From this quotation it is apparent that executive power is the “force” of the 
body politic. But not having even entertained such a possibility, the Article 
persists in its empty vessel and law-executing definition.  
More pertinent for Americans, the Article quotes Rutherforth:  
It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common understanding, 
or joint sense of the body politic, to determine and direct what is right to be 
done: and it belongs to the executive power, considered as the common or joint 
strength of the same body, to carry what is so determined and directed into 
execution.105  
This quotation sounds promising for the law-execution and empty vessel 
theory; and recall that the Article views the quotation as justifying “agency 
rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization.”106 But this twists 
Rutherforth to justify delegation. 
For starters, Rutherforth viewed executive power not merely as law 
execution, but as the society’s “joint strength.”107 Second, he did not embrace 
the delegation of legislative power to the executive, for he thought that “the 
executive power, in the nature of the thing, is not discretionary in any part.”108 
Third, he recognized that constitutions could vary from the assumption he 
drew from nature, and he argued that constitutions frequently had to leave 
the executive wide discretion, unconfined by legislation, in the external or 
foreign application of the society’s joint strength.109  
When applied internally, the society’s joint strength served to protect 
rights and duties, and when applied externally, it more broadly protected 
against foreign threats.110 As Rutherforth explained: 
Now, the executive power is a power of acting with this joint strength, in order 
to obtain the purposes for which such strength was formed. And, consequently, 
 
 104 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 25. Indeed, Mortenson’s earlier work relies on Rousseau’s 
similar statement: “The body politic has . . . two motive powers—and we can make the same distinction 
between will and strength—the former is legislative power and the latter executive power.” Mortenson, 
supra note 6, at 1235. 
 105 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
106 Id. at 41. 
 107 See quotation in text at supra note 105.   
108 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 279. 
109 See infra text accompanying notes 111–16. 
 110 Rutherforth also wrote: “The natural use of the joint strength which a civil society forms, is either 
to preserve the rights and enforce the duties of the members of such society, in respect of one another, 
and of the public; or else to protect the whole and the several parts of it against such injuries as other civil 
societies, or other individuals, who still continue in a state of nature, or who are members of other civil 
societies might do them; to prevent such injuries from proceeding, where they are begun; or to procure 
reparation, and inflict punishment, where they are completed.” RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 273. 
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the executive power is either internal or external. We may call it internal, when 
it is exercised upon objects within the society; when it is employed in securing 
the rights, or enforcing the duties of the several members, in respect either of 
one another, or of the society itself. And we may call it external executive 
power, when it is exercised upon objects out of the society; when it is employed 
in protecting either the body or the several members of it against external 
injuries, in preventing such injuries from being done, or in procuring reparation, 
or in inflicting punishment for them, after they are done.111 
Thus, whereas the Article claims that Rutherforth has a law-executing 
definition of executive power, in the sense that the executive carries out 
legislative authorizations and instructions, Rutherforth reveals that he views 
executive power as a matter of the society’s joint strength—a power that 
internally is confined to securing rights and enforcing duties, but that is not 
always so confined externally.  
That Rutherforth thought much external executive power was not a 
matter of carrying out legislative directives is further evident from his 
account of an executive’s constitutional discretion. In many societies, he 
observed, the executive needed the constitution to assure areas of executive 
discretion or prerogative—internally in pardons, and externally in matters of 
war, peace, and treaties: 
[W]here the legislative and executive power are lodged in different hands, it is 
usual, especially if the legislative body is a large one, to allow those who have 
the executive power, to act discretionally in some cases; that is, it is usual for 
them to have, in some instances, such a discretionary power as is called 
prerogative.112 
By “prerogative,” Rutherforth meant a discretionary power. The 
“constitution of government” was what authorized and protected this 
discretion, primarily in external issues.113 He thus anticipated that an 
executive might enjoy substantial realms of constitutionally authorized 
discretion in exercising his nation’s strength externally—a discretion that, 
being constitutional, cannot easily be understood as “simply the power to 
execute the laws—an empty vessel for Congress to fill.”114 
In other words, the Article persistently misreads Rutherforth. It fails to 
recognize his conception of executive power as the society’s joint strength. 
In quoting him on the domestic application of executive power, it fails to see 
 
 111 RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 273–74. See also Rutherforth’s comment about understanding 
“the notion of executive power to consist in a power of using and applying the joint force of a civil 
society.” Id. at 275. 
112 Id. at 280 (echoing LOCKE supra note 38, at 392–93). 
113 Id. at 279–80. 
 114 Id. at 4–5 (echoing an earlier article by Mortenson: Mortenson, supra note 6, at 1234). 
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that his law-executing vision precludes the delegation of legislative power. 
And as to the external application of executive power, the Article omits to 
mention Rutherforth’s view of constitutionally established discretionary 
executive power, which did not involve the execution of congressional 
instructions. 
The methodological point is that, not for the first time, the Article fails 
to consider the range of competing views evident among European theorists. 
As I have written elsewhere: 
The definition of executive power . . . remained open to dispute even as late as 
the founding of the United States.  
Some commentators understood it to be at least the power of executing 
the law, and from this perspective they said it was ministerial. . . . Others 
recognized that, if this power was not legislative or judicial . . . it was the entire 
power of exercising the physical force of the government.115 
If the Article had simply been more careful in reading the authors it quotes, 
it might have noticed that some Europeans defined executive power as the 
nation’s action, strength, or force.116 
B. The Constitution 
Of course, European theory is not the same as the Constitution. Though 
the framers were familiar with at least some European theories, they made 
their own choices. In fact, the Framers made deliberate departures from 
European theory and practice in many instances. So, whatever the weight of 
different opinions in different parts of Europe, one must ultimately focus on 
the Constitution, its framing, and its ratification. 
Where does this more focused inquiry lead? Not to a law-executing 
power, let alone an empty vessel. 
In accord with what was already the conventional default mode of 
conveying powers,117 the Constitution vests the executive power in the 
President, and then clarifies or adjusts this power with various additions and 
limitations, including the limit that the President “shall take Care that the 
 
 115 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 328 n.a. 
 116 Ideas of force also underlay John Locke’s vision. He explained:  
Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in 
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed, at the same time, in the hands of 
distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost 
impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands. . . .  
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 384. 
 117 For the default allocation of power, including discussions from before the adoption of the 
Constitution, see HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 328–30.  
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Laws be faithfully executed.”118 The Constitution thus addresses law 
execution as one of the President’s duties, not as one of his powers. A law-
executing authority undoubtedly could be implied from the duty, but this 
only reinforces the difference between the executive power and the authority 
to execute the law. Evidently, the Constitution does not consider the law-
executing authority to be the same as the executive power. This means either 
that the law-executing authority stands apart from the executive power or, 
much more probably, that it is merely an element of the executive power—
all of which is consistent with the view that the executive power is the 
nation’s action, strength, or force. 
Reinforcing this conclusion is Alexander Hamilton’s statement in 
Federalist No. 78 that the Constitution divides the government’s powers into 
those of “force,” “will,” and “judgment”—that is, executive force, legislative 
will, and judicial judgment.119 The Article does not even mention this 
statement. Yet the Federalist was the most widely circulated and admired 
exposition of the Constitution during its ratification, and the distribution of 
the Federalist was thought to be crucial for the Constitution’s adoption.120 Its 
summary of executive power is therefore significant. Amid evidence of 
contested European opinions, one must look at the Constitution and its 
framing and ratification to understand the choices made by Americans, and 
there is little better evidence from the ratification than the Federalist. 
What is one to say about a discussion of executive power that does not 
wrestle with the Constitution’s language? Or that does not mention the 
possibility, notably discussed even in the Federalist, that executive power 
is the nation’s action, strength, or force? 
This much is clear: it is difficult to understand the Constitution’s 
executive power merely as a matter of executing the law. And it is more than 
slightly mistaken to assert that “[t]he founders unanimously understood 
executive power as the narrow but potent authority to carry out projects 
defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power.”121 On both grounds, the 
 
 118 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 119 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST 523–24 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961) (“The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the 
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties 
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either 
the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no 
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and 
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”). 
 120 For the circulation of the Federalist in book form, not to mention newspaper reprintings, 
“throughout America,” see 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 141 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber, & 
Margaret A. Hogan eds., 2003). 
 121 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis added).  
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Article’s vision of executive power is a poor basis for attacking 
nondelegation. 
III. FROM MISDIRECTED ATTACKS TO A RELEVANT DEBATE 
The Article’s attack on the nondelegation doctrine is strangely 
misplaced. Rather than challenging decaying Supreme Court doctrine on 
nondelegation or offering improbable visions of what the Executive can do, 
the debate needs to come to terms with the Constitution’s principles of 
vesting and executive power. 
The Article is misdirected both personally and conceptually. The 
Article takes aim at my 2014 book for attempting to “give originalist bone 
fides to the nondelegation doctrine.”122 But this is puzzling. For one thing, 
my book expressly disclaims reliance on originalism.123 More centrally, I 
have always opposed the nondelegation doctrine. 
My 2014 book already argued that “it is utterly misleading to frame the 
debate in terms of ‘the nondelegation doctrine’”—because “the focus on ‘the 
nondelegation doctrine’ reduces the controversy to one of mere doctrine, as 
if no larger principle were at stake.”124 More recently, my arguments have 
gone further, observing that the Constitution does not speak in terms of 
delegation and nondelegation. Instead, it vests its powers. It thus must be 
considered whether a congressional transfer of legislative powers violates 
the Constitution’s vesting of such powers in Congress and, in addition, 
divests Congress of the power vested in it.125 
 
 122 Id. at 15 (“The latest installment in the campaign to give originalist bona fides to the 
nondelegation doctrine came in Philip Hamburger’s Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, published in 
2014.”). 
 123 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 10 (“[A]lthough some defenses of administrative law complain 
about original intent, this inquiry rests on something closer to original sin. Whatever one thinks about 
intent—especially if one fears it as a return to the constitutional past—it should be kept in mind that this 
inquiry focuses on something very different: the danger that the government already has returned to the 
preconstitutional past. Thus, rather than appeal to any interpretative doctrine, whether the living 
constitution or original intent, this book draws attention to one of the central dangers that prompted the 
development of constitutions. Much will be said about the history of the Constitution, but the argument 
here mainly concerns the revival of a historically dangerous sort of power.”).  
 Incidentally, Mortenson and Bagley also say that my 2014 book was part of a “campaign” on behalf 
the nondelegation doctrine. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 15 (“The latest installment in the 
campaign to give originalist bona fides to the nondelegation doctrine came in Philip Hamburger’s Is 
Administrative Law Unlawful?. . .”). Who knew! 
 124 HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 378–79. 
 125 See NCLA Gundy Brief, supra note 90, at 5–10. Incidentally, the Article also accuses originalists 
of the “nonsense . . . that there was anything intrinsically non-delegable about legislative power. The 
people already delegated it once. Adherents of the nondelegation doctrine must therefore be arguing for 
a non-redelegation principle.” Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 27. Curiously, that is exactly my 
position, for my book prominently argues that “the difficulty is not delegation, but subdelegation.” 
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The Article’s failure to engage with the vesting and divesting point is 
all the more striking because it frames its argument as a response to Gundy 
v. United States and especially Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion.126 That 
is precisely the case in which I argued that the Court should abandon the 
nondelegation doctrine and instead recognize that the Constitution bars any 
divesting of its powers.127 That is also the case in which Justice Gorsuch 
moved toward this argument, saying “we have an obligation to decide 
whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of its legislative 
responsibilities” and that “Congress may not divest itself of its legislative 
power by transferring that power to an executive agency.”128 
What, then, is one to make of an article that does not even notice the 
implications of the Constitution’s vesting of powers?129 If the debate was 
really still the same as in the 1930s, the Article would be on point. But given 
that the debate is evolving in its focus from delegation and nondelegation to 
vesting and divesting, an attack on nondelegation seems at best a 
distraction—an assault more on the dead than the living. 
Similarly, in ignoring the possibility that executive power is the nation’s 
action, strength, or force, the Article does not address the strongest 
alternative point of view. Unlike the Constitution’s vesting of powers, the 
vision of executive power as the nation’s action, strength, or force has not 
yet risen to prominence in a judicial opinion. But that is not to say it is 
entirely obscure.130 And it is distinctively consistent with both the 
Constitution and the lived experience of the Executive, from the founding to 
the present. Rather than confront this perspective, however, the Article takes 
aim at more stereotyped and vulnerable arguments. The result, once again, 
is an odd failure to engage with the arguments that demand attention. 
What is needed are debates not about strawmen, but about the 
Constitution’s principles of vesting and executive power. These principles 
are evident from the Constitution itself, and they echo notable prior theories. 
There is no excuse for ignoring them. 
 
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at  377. Indeed, an entire chapter is entitled “Subdelegated.” The point is not 
that the Article needs to cite my book, but rather that it should not generalize about the “nonsense” 
propounded by other scholars. 
 126 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 2–3, 6, 17–23, 30, 32, 68–70, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 87, 97, 
105, 109 (regarding Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019)); id. at 3, 17–21, 22, 24–25, 31, 68–
70, 75, 79, 83–84, 87, 105, 107 (regarding Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Gundy). 
 127 NCLA Gundy Brief, supra note 90, at 5–10. 
 128 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135, 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 129 The Article once quotes Justice Gorsuch on divesting, but without noticing that such terminology 
might be significant. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 68. 
 130 Id.; NCLA Gundy Brief, supra note 90, at 5–10. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been seen that Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s article is 
problematic on several grounds. Most basically, its own evidence often 
contradicts its conclusions. Equally telling is the evidence it omits—whether 
in European theory, the Constitution, or the Federalist. Underlying all of this 
is a deeper failure to explore ideas with greater openness to alternative 
viewpoints. Indeed, the Article does not even respond to the strongest and 
most recent arguments on the other side—it does not even mention them. 
All the same, the Mortenson and Bagley article is conceptually 
valuable, for it serves as a reminder of the possibilities it leaves unexplored. 
This Essay, therefore, recalls a pair of inadequately appreciated 
constitutional principles. First, rather than generically delegate its powers, 
the Constitution more specifically vests them. It thereby bars Congress from 
vesting its powers in other bodies and from divesting itself of such powers. 
Second, the Constitution establishes an executive power that is not confined 
to law execution, but that instead encompasses the nation’s action, strength, 
or force. 
Of course, this Essay can only briefly present the logic and 
constitutional foundation of these ideas. But there is much to be said for 
them, and they now at least have been tabled in such a manner that they can 
no longer be brushed aside. 
 
 
